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mean which, we show, in turn affects the incidence of adverse selection among retained
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“Google is organized around the ability to attract and leverage the talent of exceptional
technologists and business people”. Open letter from Google’s founders prior to IPO,
April 2004.
1 Introduction
It has often been remarked that firms wishing to enhance the general human capital of their
employees face the prospect of having wages bid up at the expense of profit. The simplest
solution, proposed by Becker (1964), is to have workers pay for such skills up-front. Of course,
this is impractical when the sums involved are significant, especially for credit constrained
workers at the outset of their careers. As the above quote attests, innovative firms for whom
human capital development is especially important must therefore organise in a manner that
both attracts and exploits talented workers.1 This paper explores the role of what might be
called information management policies in the context of this organisational design problem.
Indeed, we do so in a stylised model that identifies organisational design with human capital
management via information management. Specifically, organisation design consists of firms
choosing and committing to information disclosure policies as part of the initial contracts used
to compete for new workers.
The paper makes two contributions. First, we characterise optimal information man-
agement policies as a function of technological differences across firms. Our results here are
driven by a simple trade-off: policies that best enable firms to exploit talent (by capturing
general human capital rents) make it hard to attract employees, and vice versa. Equilibrium
policies therefore reflect the relative importance to the firm of attracting versus exploiting
talent. Second, we show how optimal information management policies impact on sector-
specific and economy wide-wage distributions and turnover rates.2
In brief outline the model is as follows. Firms compete to hire workers in each of two
periods. Initial contracts consist of a wage offer and disclosure policy. Having chosen a first
period employer, workers generate performance statistics which are privately observed by
their employer, as well as acquiring skills that are valuable in second period production. Out-
side firms observe some statistic of this information as determined by the disclosure policy
and then make second period wage offers. Having observed these offers, first period employ-
ers decide whether to retain their workers (matching the highest outside offer) or to release
1We understand ‘leveraging of talent’ to be a combination of enhancing the human capital of employees and
exploiting that human capital by retaining some of the rents in terms of higher profits. Simply endowing workers
with a large quantity of general human capital is a poor business model unless a way can be found to recapture
some of the rents.
2Acemoglu (2002) stresses that technological changes are likely to alter the ways in which firms organise pro-
duction and consequently impact on labour market outcomes. The current paper endorses this view and details
such a mechanism.
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them. Workers then engage in second period production and the game ends.
This model is designed to exploit familiar ideas, with the predominant forces at work
simply being adverse selection and regression to the mean.3 The latter arises because the em-
ployer’s best estimates – based on her private information – of worker second period produc-
tivity if retained within the firm (retained human capital) and if released to join another firm
(general human capital) are not perfectly correlated. In other words, there is a “match spe-
cific” component to productivity; sometimes workers will be expected to be more productive
if retained and sometimes more productive if released. In this context, regression to the mean
implies that workers with high retained productivity are likely to have lower productivity
elsewhere, conversely workers with low retained productivity in their first employment are
expected to have higher productivity elsewhere. This provides a reason for some workers to
switch jobs purely on the grounds of efficiency. A contribution of the paper is to explore how
this ‘legitimate’ reason for job turnover interacts with the other fundamental force, adverse
selection, as firms choose information management policies.
To see how this choice is resolved, note that disclosure polices impact on the future ca-
reers of workers and future firm profits. Each possible disclosure policy therefore generates a
pair of outcomes: expected future earnings for the worker and expected future profits for the
firm. The set of all possible disclosure policies will lead to a set of such possible outcomes.
The human capital management policy for our firms corresponds to the best choice from this
feasible set, bearing in mind that first period wages can transfer future profit to workers but,
because of credit constraints, not necessarily future wages to profit. Firms facing competition
to attract workers (competitive firms) will seek to maximise efficiency and will therefore choose
different disclosure policies to ‘technologically advantaged’ firms facing limited competition
and whose objectives include the transformation of worker rent into profits via adverse selec-
tion (skill-augmenting firms).
Adverse selection arises when outside employers draw inferences from the current em-
ployer’s retention decision. A disclosure policy that eliminates the need to make this inference
therefore removes adverse selection. This will evidently happen if the first period employer
discloses its best estimate of outside productivity. Equally, if the employer discloses its best
estimate of inside productivity, then public information is finer than that contained in the re-
tention decision, so once again there is no adverse selection. Since these two policies induce
the same adverse selection (and hence the same expected wage), firms will evaluate them on
the basis of their efficiency in allocating labour. In Section 3.1, we show that the first policy
is best in this respect because the wage auction achieves an efficient allocation. A corollary
3Adverse selection can, of course, be traced back to Akerlof (1970). Regression to the mean predates even
Galton (1885) who fixed the idea in what Koenker (2001) calls “Arguably, the most important statistical graphic
ever produced.” Galton’s graphic related child and parental height. Tall parents tend to have tall children, though
not so tall as themselves. Similarly for short parents. Of course, we are concerned with productivity in first and
subsequent employments rather than heights of parents and children but the principal is the same.
3
of this observation is that competitive firms, seeking to maximise total surplus, will choose
to disclose their best estimate of outside productivity. Such policies maximise the amount of
wage inequality over all policies which generate no adverse selection.
More generally, we can define the quantity of adverse selection at each realisation of the
disclosed statistic as the difference between the wage if there were no private information and
its equilibrium value. In Section 3.2, in our joint normal specification of the model, we show
that disclosure policies consisting of a garbled report of the firm’s best estimate of outside
productivity (i.e. estimate plus random noise) generate an amount of adverse selection that
is independent of the realisation. This simply means that conditioning on the retention event
shifts down the regression line. These policies do not, however, generate the most favourable
trade-off between efficiency and adverse selection. Specifically, we identify policies for which
the retention event tilts the regression line such that adverse selection is imposed more heavily
on those workers which it is efficient for the firm to retain. Evidently, this makes it cheaper
to retain workers for a given level of efficiency. We show that the best policies from this
perspective take a simple form—disclosure of (the best estimate of) a weighted difference
between productivity outside and within the firm.4
The above result has implications for labour market outcomes. In Section 3.2, we cal-
culate how wage distributions and labour turnover rates respond, via information manage-
ment policies, to technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector. A decline in either
the mean of estimated general human capital formation or mean match quality, or an in-
crease in the variance of estimated match quality, increases the rate of labour turnover in the
skill-augmenting sector. Interestingly, since an increase in the variance of an estimate can
be interpreted as an improvement in information, this suggests that observed increases in
labour turnover could stem from improved information acquisition within ‘innovative’ firms.
Turning to the distribution of wages, an increase in the “skill-gap” (the expected human cap-
ital difference between the skill-augmenting and competitive firms) increases inequality and
skews the distribution of wage in the skill-augmenting sector to the left, while an increase
in the mean, or a reduction in the variance, of estimated match quality increases inequality
but has little impact on skewness. We conclude by noting that the analysis easily extends to
economy-wide outcomes and offers a potential (unified) explanation for increases in labour
turnover and right skewness in wage distributions.
Related Literature As noted above, our analysis draws on the familiar concepts of adverse
selection and regression to the mean (the latter inducing match quality). These concepts have
been applied in the labour economics literature, although typically separately. The notion of
match quality was introduced by Jovanovic (1979) who shows that a non-degenerate distribu-
4In the language of auction theory, the auctioneer discloses a combination of common and private valuations,
rather than, e.g., a garbling of the common valuation.
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tion of worker-firm match values leads to worker turnover as information about match values
accrues over time. In emphasising the dynamics of the learning process, Jovanovic abstracts
from general human capital and (hence) adverse selection aspects. In contrast, Greenwald
(1986) focuses squarely on adverse selection, highlighting that this force can lead workers to
earn less than their marginal products and limit labour turnover.5 Indeed, in Greenwald’s
model turnover is limited to such an extent that separations only occur for exogenous rea-
sons. We show that introducing a non-degenerate distribution of match quality into a model
of general human capital formation counterbalances the forces of adverse selection. Even
when firms hold private information relating to general human capital (the Greenwald case),
our model endogenously generates positive labour turnover.
In this sense, our paper is related to Li (2006) who also seeks to explain job mobility in
the presence of asymmetric information over worker productivity. Li models the wage deter-
mination process as a first price auction. This creates a bidding situation similar to Milgrom
and Weber’s (1981) analysis of the ‘mineral rights’ model in which there is a single informed
bidder and a number of uninformed bidders. In this setting, the uninformed bidders adopt a
mixed strategy which generates positive turnover and a nondegenerate distribution of wages.
In our model wages are determined via a second price auction and turnover arises from the
non-degenerate distribution of match quality. Notably, this gives an efficiency rationale for
turnover that is absent in Li’s model. A further difference is that Li assumes the information
structure to be exogenously fixed.
Eeckhout (2006) also studies a setting where current employers (exogenously) have su-
perior information to outsiders. In his model there is gradual learning, as in Jovanovic (1979),
but over general human capital rather than match quality. This approach contrasts with our
model where information asymmetries are endogenous and there is persistence in match-
specific values (the latter leads to our regression to the mean effect). A further difference
arises in the wage-determination process. In Eeckhout’s model wages are determined via a
second price auction with two heterogenous bidders − an incumbent and a challenger, each
of whom have private information. In our model, wages are pinned down by the behaviour
of (interim) identical outside firms. This “competitive fringe” assumption greatly simplifies
the analysis.
Although we abstract from internal organisation costs of information management in
order to focus on the adverse selection efficiency trade-off most directly, our paper relates to
a significant organisational economics literature in which internal organisation costs play a
major role. Waldman (1984) (and more recently DeVaro and Waldman (2005)), Ricart-i-Costa
(1988) and Blanes i Vidal (2007) argue that, since adverse selection in the labor market can
5The fact that workers earn less than their marginal products gives rise to the possibility of firm-sponsored
human capital investments. This idea is developed in many subsequent papers including Katz and Ziderman
(1990), Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) provide a review
that emphasises the role of exogenous market frictions.
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affect wages,6 retention rates and thereby profits, firms will have incentives to distort (respec-
tively) promotion, task assignment or delegation decisions. These are examples where organ-
isational design is partly motivated by human capital management issues and, furthermore,
impacts through information flows to the labour market.7
Finally, our paper is also closely related to a growing literature studying information
disclosure (see, e.g., Calzolari and Pavan (2006), Mukherjee (2006), Koch and Peyrache (2004),
Albano and Leaver (2005), Almazan, Suarez and Titman (2006)). Like the current paper, this
literature highlights that an employer’s information management policy forms part of overall
compensation as it influences an employee’s future career prospects.8 Typically, however, the
focus has been on a choice between full and no disclosure, circumstances in which full disclo-
sure is optimal or moral hazard problems. We do not consider moral hazard, but do allow for
more general disclosure policies and focus in greater detail on labour market outcomes.
2 The Model
2.1 Description
The economy consists of N firms, M < N workers and an array of random variables repre-
senting information and productivity. Firms compete to hire, or retain, a worker in periods
one and two. A first period employer, some firm I, can control information flows to other
outside firms. It is convenient to refer to first period employment as training.
Information. If a worker trains at firm I, firm I privately observes a vector-valued ‘test
statistic’ QI . Outside firms observe nothing at this stage. The vector QI should be thought
of as everything the firm knows about its worker; it will generally include first period output
in the firm, but for simplicity we assume the value of this production component to be zero.
Productivity. While training at firm I a worker acquires skills that are useful in future pro-
duction. Let YI I denote the value of a worker’s second period output when retained in firm
I, YI I′ the value of her second period output when released to a different firm I′ and YI the
vector productivities (for all N second period employers) following training at firm I.
6Gibbons and Katz (1991) present empirical support for the economic significance of such effects. More recently,
Schönberg (2007) finds evidence of adverse selection for college graduates, while Hu and Taber (2005) find a
marked effect for white males.
7Burguet, Caminal and Matutes (1999) take a different path using similar ingredients. They argue that in
certain industries, specifically professional sports, characterised by extreme visibility of performance, incentives
are created for restrictive labour practices—such as transfer fees.
8Calzolari and Pavan (2006) allow for general disclosure policies, and do not have a labour market application
specifically in mind. They do not consider the possibility of retention and assume a monopsonist employer in the
second period, leading to somewhat different effects and considerations.
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First Period Contracts The N firms compete to hire a worker in the first period through
publicly observable contracts. For a given firm I, a contract specifies:
1. A training wage wI ≥ 0. The worker is credit constrained.
2. A disclosure policy TI = TI(QI) from a set of possible disclosure policies ΓI to be dis-
cussed in detail in Section 3. Note that we assume firms cannot disclose what they do
not know. We do not consider randomised disclosure policies (QI will generally contain
noise terms however).
Employment Wage Determination Outside firms compete to hire a worker in the second
period and make “take it or lose it” employment wage offers. First period employers then
either match the best offer made to their worker or release this worker to join one of the
highest outside bidders. We discuss alternative wage determination procedures in Section
2.4.
2.2 Simplifying Assumptions
In order to simplify the analysis of the employment wage determination process, we impose
the following assumption on the joint distribution of test statistics and productivities.
Assumption 1. For any pair of firms I and I ′, (QI , YI I) and (QI , YI I′) have identical distributions.
Outside firms are therefore interim identical. For any given disclosure policy adopted by the
first period employer, outside firms all take the same view of the worker’s likely output in
their firm in the second period. Given this assumption, we can uniquely define
GI =
de f
E[YI I′ |QI ], I 6= I′.
The random variable GI is the first period employer’s best estimate of the worker’s value in
an outside employment (her general human capital). Since the first period employer holds all
of the information relating to this worker in the economy, GI is also the quantity that outside
firms seek to estimate when making their employment wage offers. Similarly, we can define
RI =
de f
E[YI I |QI ].
The random variable RI is the first period employer’s best estimate of the worker’s value in
the current, inside employment (her retained human capital).9
GI will generally differ from RI . Experience QI = q may reveal that a worker fits es-
pecially well with firm I (E[YI I |QI = q] > E[YI I′ |QI = q]) or, equally, that there has been a
9Our analysis allows QI to contain YI I and YI I ′ but certainly does not rest on this assumption; all that is required
is that firm I learns something about its worker’s likely inside and outside value during training.
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bad match. Differences between GI and RI will play an important role in our analysis, with
the statistical possibility of a bad match endogenously generating labour turnover. It is natu-
ral to adopt a framework in which this matching manifests itself through regression to the
mean: workers who perform well (badly) in their initial employment will tend to perform
worse (better) if they switch jobs. This corresponds to an assumption that the regression ‘line’
E[GI |RI = x] has a slope (derivative) everywhere between zero and one, implying, for in-
stance, that Cov(GI , RI) ≥ 0 and Cov(RI − GI , RI) ≥ 0. In fact, we will make a somewhat
stronger assumption.
Assumption 2. For each firm I, the pair of random variables (RI −GI , GI) are affiliated with density
logconcave in each variable taken separately.
It follows that, E[GI |RI = r], r − E[GI |RI = r] and E[GI |RI − GI = r] are all increasing in
r.10 For any w ∈ R, E[GI |RI ≤ w] ≤ E[GI ] and E[GI |RI ≥ w] ≥ E[GI ].
Regression to the mean introduces a “genuine reason for sale” which counterbalances the
standard Akerlof lemons effect and tends to protect the market for experienced workers from
complete collapse. Given regression to the mean, in the absence of any further information
disclosure, an outside firm need not conclude that any worker it can hire at a given wage will
generate a loss at that wage; rather, a released worker may simply have been a bad match. A
further implication of regression to the mean is that efficiency in the allocation of labour re-
quires a positive turnover of workers; to maximise career productivity, a selection of workers
should switch jobs in the second period.
With Assumption 1 in hand, characterising employment wage determination is rela-
tively straightforward. Since outside employers are interim identical, employment wages
will be set in Bertrand competition, and hence equal the expected productivity of a worker in
an outside firm conditional on the publicly available information. This information includes
the event that the worker is released by her current employer.11 The equilibrium employ-
ment wage when a worker is employed by firm I and TI = TI(QI) = t is realised is defined
implicitly by
wTI (t) = E[GI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)], (1)
whenever such a wTI (t) exists.
12 The notation wTI (t) denotes the wage payable under disclo-
sure policy TI = TI(QI) when TI = t is realised (we use TI to denote both the disclosure policy
and the random variable that it generates); wTI (TI) therefore denotes the random wage which
10For a proof of this claim, see the Appendix.
11The relevance of this event to employers bidding for GI (common values) is familiar from auction theory.
12At this level of generality, we cannot rule out (perverse) cases where the implicit function theorem fails. In
such cases, the equation does not define the function wTI , however, the condition is still required to hold. Also, it
is possible that there is no w such that w = E[GI |TI = t, RI ≤ w], in which case we set wTI (t) = inf supp GI .
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will be generated by the disclosure policy. We will write the expected employment wage as
WTI = E[wTI (TI)]. (2)
It is important to note that we have not assumed that all firms are identical. Of course,
firms are not all interim identical because a first period employer has private information
about its worker. Neither have we assumed that the firms are ex-ante identical since, under
Assumption 1, the joint distribution of (QI , YI) can differ across first period employers. We
take the view that certain firms, typically innovative or in some other way privileged, natu-
rally enable workers to acquire more skills.13 As such, we do not assume that E[GI ] = E[GI′ ]
for all I, I′. Rather, we make the next simplest assumption which is to distinguish between
“skill-augmenting” and “competitive” firms. When we wish to invoke this distinction we
will refer to a typical skill-augmenting firm as firm K and a typical competitive firm as firm J
(I continues to denote a generic firm).
Assumption 3. There are N1 < M skill-augmenting firms and N − N1 competitive firms in the
economy. Competitive firms are exchangeable: for each pair of competitive firms J, J′, (QJ , YJ I)
is equal in distribution to (QJ′ , YJ′ I). For each skill-augmenting firm K, (GK, RK) has the same
distributions as (GJ + ∆K, RJ + ∆K) for some ∆K > 0. In other words skill augmenting firms,
simply add ∆K to the general human capital of their employees.
Just as Assumption 1 simplifies second period labour market competition, Assumption
3 simplifies first period labour market competition. Skill-augmenting firms are advantaged
and in short-supply, and will (therefore) all hire one worker at the prevailing wage. This
leaves the remaining N − N1 exchangeable firms to Bertrand compete for the M − N1 free
workers. It is this Bertrand competition that determines the prevailing wage. Our concern
will be to explore how the employment policies of different firms vary with the size of the
skill gap. We remark that the skill gap is treated here as exogenous but in a natural variant of
the model it could arise from firms choosing to invest in general human capital.
When discussing labour market outcomes, it will be of interest to consider a variant of
Assumption 3 in which N1 is a variable parameter which may exceed the number of workers
M. In this event (corresponding to a high demand for labour in the skill-augmenting sector),
the employment wage will be set by skill-augmenting firms themselves.
13The quote heading this article hints that Google may be one such a firm. Although the history of Silicon Valley
is still in the making, there are analogies with high tech industries of the early industrial revolution. Tweedale
(1996) discusses human capital in the Sheffield steel industry during the 19th Century and quotes “... [when a
melter] knocked the end off the cold ingot [he] saw in the fractured surface more than a college full of analysts
could tell him ... [and] ...could distinguish ... a variation in hardness corresponding to a fiftieth part of one percent
of carbon.” “Firms were very secretive.” “Some of these melters became very wealthy men.”
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Assumption 3′. There are N1 exchangeable skill-augmenting firms and N − N1 exchangeable com-
petitive firms in the economy. For each skill-augmenting firm K, the skill gap ∆ = E[GK] −
E[GJ ] is positive.
Assumption 3′ differs from Assumption 3 in that all the skill augmenting firms are identical.
This will serve to make wage setting Bertrand-competitive in the case where N1 > M.
2.3 Equilibrium
Our simplifying assumptions enable us to characterise equilibria piecemeal by solving two
maximisation problems, one for a representative competitive firm J and another for a skill
augmenting firm K. To state these problems we will introduce two final pieces of notation.
The first is expected second period profit, equal to output less employment wages in the event
that the worker is retained (which occurs if the profits from doing so are positive), and which
we write as
ΠTI = E[(RI − wTI (TI))+], (3)
where (x)+ denotes x when positive, zero otherwise. The second is the feasible set, Ω(ΓI).
This set is the main object of our analysis and consists of the expected employment wage-
second period profit pairs (WTI ,ΠTI ) that can be achieved for a given set of disclosure policies,
ΓI .
Competitive firms attempt to hire one of the M− N1 ‘free’ workers in the first period by
offering to pay their entire expected second period profit in training wages: wJ = ΠTJ . Thus,
the problem facing a competitive firm J when choosing a disclosure policy is simply one of
expected surplus maximisation
max
(WTJ ,ΠTJ )∈Ω(ΓJ)
WTJ +ΠTJ . (4)
This behaviour by competitive firms pins down a worker’s outside-option. Any worker
turning down a training contract at a skill-augmenting firm can receive the solution to (4)
at a competitive firm. Denoting this equilibrium outside-option by U¯ (suppressing the de-
pendence on ΓJ), the problem facing a skill-augmenting firm K (or indeed any other) can be
written as
max
(WTK ,ΠTK )∈Ω(ΓK)
WTK +ΠTK − U¯ + (U¯ −WTK)−, (5)
where (x)− denotes x when negative, zero otherwise. Notice that when U¯ > WTK , the maxi-
mand in (5) differs from that in (4) only by a constant, and when U¯ ≤ WTK it coincides with
(3); the firm chooses the training wage and disclosure policy to maximize its second period
profits.
We define an equilibrium as an array of training contracts for competitive firms {wJ , TJ}J
each satisfying wage consistency (1) and surplus maximisation (4), and an array of training
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contracts for skill augmenting firms {wK, TK}K each satisfying wage consistency and (worker
participation constrained) profit maximisation (5). The maximisation problems are entirely
straightforward, save for establishing the feasible set. Before going on to discuss Ω(ΓI) in
detail, we conclude this Section with a brief discussion of key modelling choices.
2.4 Discussion of Assumptions
Minimum Wages The existence of a lower bound on the initial (training) wage offered to
workers plays a central role in our analysis. Specifically, it is a firm’s desire to claw back fu-
ture rents from a credit constrained worker which drives its information management policy.
To simplify the analysis, we abstract from any lower bound on second period wages. Note
that if there were such a bound, it would be necessary to specify what happened to work-
ers whose ex-post competitive wage fell below this bound. One could assume some form of
employment protection whereby workers who are not bid away at the minimum wage retain
their position in their current employment, or more interestingly, unemployment. Thus ex-
tended, our framework would generate predictions not only about labour turnover and wage
inequality but also flows into unemployment. It is one of a number of possible extensions left
for future research(ers).
Employment Wage Determination The model of employment wage determination is that
outside firms bid up wages and the current employer gets to retain the worker by matching
the best outside offer. Equivalently, there is an ascending open auction in which firms bid up
wages until all but one firm drops out of the bidding. We briefly discuss two alternatives.
One alternative is for contracts to specify the employment wage function rather than the
disclosure policy. If the function wTI is part of the initial contract (alongside the training wage)
and the performance realisation (TI(QI)) is explicitly disclosed, then the same results obtain.14
As noted above, another alternative that does deliver somewhat different results is proposed
by Li (2006). Li’s first price auction model would appear to be appropriate in cases where final
wage offers can be made by either side of the market, but not credibly communicated to the
other side before the wage round must be concluded.
3 Analysis
We proceed in two stages. First in Section 3.1 we establish some benchmark results under our
general distributional assumptions for (GI , RI) but with a highly restricted set of available
14Providing the wage function is monotone, the contract is public information and the employment wage is
observable, it would be immaterial whether the performance realisation (TI(QI)) was also explicitly disclosed.
Note however, that it is possible for a disclosure policy to give rise a wage function wTI (t) that is not monotone in
t.
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disclosure policies. Specifically, we focus on the case where ΓI = {GI , RI ,∅I} in which firms
choose between disclosing everything of interest to their competitors for labour GI , disclosing
the realised productivity of the worker in their current employment (more strictly, the estimate
of future productivity within the firm), and disclosing nothing. Most of the related literature
also restricts attention to these policies. Our analysis clarifies the forces at work and fixes some
general features of the feasible set. Then, in Section 3.2, we specialise to the joint normal case.
This allows us to explicitly trace through the impact of information management on labour
market outcomes when there is a rich set of alternative disclosure policies.
3.1 General Distribution, Restricted Disclosure Policies
3.1.1 Disclosure Policies, ΓI = {GI ,RI ,∅I}
Here we restrict the policy space to the following three more or less natural disclosure policies.
1. GI−disclosure, firm I discloses its best estimate15 of the worker’s general human capital:
TI(QI) = E[YJ I |QI ] = GI .
2. RI−disclosure, firm I discloses its best estimate of the worker’s productivity if retained
within the firm TI(QI) = E[YI I |QI ] = RI .
3. ∅I−disclosure,16 firm I discloses no information: TI(QI) = ∅I .
3.1.2 The Feasible Set
Characterising the feasible set amounts to ranking WTI and ΠTI for the disclosure policies in
ΓI . We start with employment wages, and first define the degree of adverse selection when TI = t
is realised
ASTI (t) = E[GI | TI = t]− E[GI | TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)]. (6)
The quantity ASTI (t) measures how much lower the employment wage is when outside firms
condition on the employer’s retention behaviour in addition to the realisation TI = t. Ex-
pected adverse selection equals the expected shortfall in employment wages from outside
productivity,
E[ASTI (TI)] = E[GI ]−WTI . (7)
15Note that the same results would be achieved by disclosing all of the available information in the vector QI .
Throughout we restrict our attention to scalar disclosure statistics.
16We retain the subscript since the type of the firm is informative: W∅K will not in general equal W∅J .
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GI−disclosure
wGI (GI) = E[GI |GI , RI ≤ wG(GI)] = GI . (8)
Notice that there is no adverse selection under general disclosure: ASGI (g) = 0. This is be-
cause, having observed GI = g, outside firms have no reason to pay attention to the em-
ployer’s retention behaviour. Taking expectations over the random variable wGI (GI), the ex-
pected employment wage is simply expected general human capital
WG = E[GI ]. (9)
RI−disclosure
wR(RI) = E[GI |RI , RI ≤ wR(RI)] = E[GI |RI ]. (10)
Again, there is no adverse selection, ASRI (r) = 0; in this case because the disclosed statistic
RI = r supplies finer information than the event that the worker is released, RI ≤ wR(r).
However, there is now regression to the mean, with r − E[GI |RI = r] increasing in r. Intu-
itively, outside firms anticipate that low (high) values of firm I productivity may be due to
a negative (positive) match and that productivity in a new match will tend to regress to the
ex-ante expected value. By the law of iterated expectations, the expected employment wage
is still equal to expected general human capital
WR = E[(E[GI |RI ])] = E[GI ]. (11)
∅I−disclosure
w∅I = E[GI |RI ≤ w∅]. (12)
There is now adverse selection, AS∅I > 0. However, in contrast to Akerlof’s (1970) Lemons
model or Greenwald’s (1986) application to the labour market, w∅I does not collapse to the
lower support of GI (even in the absence of a minimum wage) because outside firms anticipate
that low values of firm I productivity will partly be redressed by regression to the mean.
Using the above wage comparisons, we now state two results which characterise the
feasible set Ω({GI , RI ,∅I}).
Proposition 1. For any firm I, GI−disclosure generates maximum expected surplus.
Proof. Under GI−disclosure, wGI (GI) = GI and so, from (3), ΠGI = E[(RI − GI)+].
SummingΠGI and WGI gives E[GI ] + E[(RI − GI)+] which is clearly the maximum achievable
expected surplus.
Under GI−disclosure a first period employer releases its worker whenever RI ≤ GI .
Since this implies that the worker is released if and only if there is a negative match, labour is
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always efficiently allocated across firms. The same cannot be said of the two other disclosure
policies. Under RI−disclosure, firm I releases its worker whenever RI < E[GI ] and so it is
possible for the worker to be released following a positive match (because GI is low) and
retained following a negative match (because GI is high). As we now show, ∅I−disclosure is
less efficient still.
Proposition 2. For any firm I,
i. RI−disclosure generates WRI = WGI , ΠRI ≤ ΠGI ;
ii. ∅I−disclosure generates W∅I ≤WGI , Π∅I ≥ ΠGI with
W∅I +Π∅I ≤WRI +ΠRI ≤WGI +ΠGI .
Proof. The ranking of expected employment wages W∅I < WRI = WGI follows from
(9), (11) and (12). The profit ranking ΠRI ≤ ΠGI follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that
WRI = WGI .
To establishΠ∅I ≥ ΠGI , note since E[GI ] ≥ w∅, it is immediate thatΠ∅I = E[(RI − w∅)+]
≥ E[(RI − E[GI ])+]. It suffices therefore to establish E[(RI − E[GI ])+] ≥ E[(RI − GI)+]. The
result follows because the variation in GI tends to cancel the variation in RI and convex func-
tions ‘like’ variation. More precisely, note that E[RI − E[GI ]|RI − GI = x]− E[RI − GI |RI −
GI = x] = E[GI − E[GI ]|RI − GI = x] is increasing in x by Assumption 2. This fact, to-
gether with the equality of means, implies the random variable E[RI − E[GI ]|RI ] is riskier than
E[RI − GI |RI ]. Using the convexity of (x)+ gives the result. To establish W∅I +Π∅I ≤ WRI +
ΠRI note that under RI−disclosure, firm I retains the worker in the event E[RI − GI |RI ] ≥ 0.
Hence the RI−disclosure allocation solves the following optimal allocation problem
max
0≤p(·)≤1
E[E[RI − GI |RI ]p(RI)],
where p is any probability of retention based on RI . The ∅I−disclosure efficiency level
E[(RI − GI).1{R ≥ w∅}] = E[E[RI − GI |RI ].1{RI ≥ w∅)]
is smaller by revealed preference.
The feasible set, Ω({GI , RI ,∅I}) as derived in Propositions 1 and 2, is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, where downward sloping lines depict points of equal expected surplus. A commitment
to GI− disclosure generates higher expected surplus for firm I than RI−disclosure because,
as noted above, it results in more efficient retention behaviour. Bertrand competition between
outside firms ensures that this expected surplus is split between firm I and its worker. Since
the expected employment wage is the same in both cases, firm I must be strictly worse off
under RI−disclosure by virtue of the “smaller pie”. Inefficient retention behaviour creates an
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even “smaller pie” under ∅I−disclosure. Intuitively, adverse selection depresses wages and
causes excess recruitment relative to RI−disclosure. The key difference now is that, although
expected surplus is smaller, the worker receives a smaller share. Proposition 2 tells us that ad-
verse selection drives the expected employment wage W∅I sufficiently far below WGI to leave
firm I better off.
Notice that, under ∅I−disclosure, adverse selection is ameliorated by regression to the
mean. A better policy for the firm would therefore be achieved by “turning off” the regression
to the mean effect. In fact, the best policy from this perspective would be one which induces
severe adverse selection for a worker the firm wishes to retain, but not for one the firm wishes
to release (so as to avoid up front transfers). We show how a policy along these lines can be
achieved in Section 3.2, where we consider disclosure policies that combine RI and GI .
3.1.3 Equilibrium Contracts and Labour Market Outcomes
In addition to characterising contracts (which are typically hard to observe), we are also inter-
ested in their consequences for observable labour market outcomes. The following all depend
heavily on the disclosure policy and are therefore characterised alongside equilibrium con-
tracts for different firms J, K:
1. Probability of labour turnover;
2. Unconditional wage distribution for workers;
3. Conditional wage distributions for retained and released workers.
The following result holds regardless of ΓJ (providing GJ−disclosure is in this set).
Proposition 3. For each competitive firm J with GJ ∈ ΓJ ,
i. Contracts: GJ−disclosure and a training wage of wJ = ΠGJ .
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability Pr[RJ < GJ ]. The dis-
tribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GJ . If GJ and (RJ − GJ) are
independent, the distribution of wages is the same for both retained and released workers; if GJ
and (RJ − GJ) are affiliated the distribution of wages for retained workers first degree stochasti-
cally dominates that for released workers.
Proof. A competitive firm J chooses GJ−disclosure since this maximises expected sur-
plus. Bertrand competition (zero profits) ensures that wJ = ΠGJ = E[(RJ − GJ)+]. The labour
market outcomes follow immediately from the choice of disclosure policy.
Proposition 3 is intuitive, the more striking results will appear when we contrast with
the situation of skill augmenting firms.
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Behaviour by competitive firms pins down U¯ = E[GJ ] + E[(RJ − GJ)+]. This observa-
tion, together with Proposition 2, enables us to solve the maximisation problem in (5), and
hence characterise the equilibrium behaviour of, and resulting labour market outcomes for,
skill-augmenting firms with available disclosure policies ΓK = {GK, RK,∅K}.
Proposition 4. For a skill augmenting firm K with ΓK = {GK, RK,∅K},
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ≤ E[GJ ] + E[(RJ − GJ)+] suffices), then
i. Contracts: GK−disclosure and a training wage of wK = max{U¯ − E[GK], 0}.
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability Pr[(RK − GK) < 0].
The distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK and, if GK and
(RK − GK) are independent, is the same for both retained and released workers.
2. If E[GK] is sufficiently large, (E[GK] > E[GJ ] + E[|RJ − GJ |] suffices), then
i. Contracts: ∅K−disclosure and a training wage of wK = max{U¯ −W∅K , 0}.
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with positive probability (less than
Pr[(RK − GK) < 0]). The distribution of employment wages is degenerate at W∅K < E[GK] for
both retained and released workers.
Proof. If E[GK] ≤ U¯, then GK−disclosure maximises surplus and the training wage
wK = U¯ − E[GK] just meets the worker participation constraint. Therefore this policy max-
imises firm K expected profit subject to the worker participation constraint. If E[GK] > U¯, then
GK−disclosure with training wages wK = 0 remains efficient but the worker receives some of
the surplus in excess of the participation constraint. In a neighbourhood where E[GK] − U¯
is positive but small, the surplus paid to the worker remains less than the efficiency loss of
switching to another disclosure policy.
If E[GK]− U¯ is positive and large enough, the extra surplus paid to the worker under
GK−disclosure will exceed the efficiency loss under null disclosure. To verify this consider
the two cases (a) w∅K ≥ U¯, (b) w∅K < U¯. For case (a) proposition 2(ii) establishes that profit is
higher under null disclosure, training wages are set at zero. In case (b) firm profit is E[(RK −
w∅K)
+]− (U¯ − w∅K) ≥ E[RK − w∅K ]− U¯ + w∅K = E[RK]− U¯. Hence, it suffices that E[RK]−
U¯ ≥ E[(RK−GK)+]. Equivalently, E[RK−GK] + E[GK]− U¯ ≥ E[(RK−GK)+], or E[GK]− U¯ ≥
−E[(RK − GK)−] = E[(GK − RK)+]. Substituting for U¯, E[GK] ≥ E[GJ ] + E[(RJ − GJ)+] +
E[(RK − GK)+]. The result follows since, by Assumption 3, RJ − GJ and RK − GK have the
same distributions.
Figure 2 displays the situation. Suppose the worker’s outside-option is at the level of
point A (above WGK ). In this case, even the high expected employment wage under GK−
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disclosure, fails to (strictly) satisfy the worker’s participation constraint. To hire the worker,
a skill augmenting firm K must surrender expected profit by paying a positive training wage.
It will adopt a policy of GK−disclosure, since this maximises the “pie” and, with the worker’s
share fixed, leaves the largest possible share for the firm.
Alternatively, suppose the worker’s outside-option is at the level of point B (below but
in the neighbourhood of WGK ). In this case, the expected employment wage under GK− dis-
closure more than meets the worker’s outside-option. The ideal strategy for firm K would
be to offer a negative training wage that held the worker to her outside-option and increased
expected profit by WGK − U¯. However, given worker credit constraints, this is not possible.
With the firm unable to claw back rent via the training wage, switching to a disclosure policy
that generates adverse selection starts to look attractive. Unfortunately for the firm, switching
to ∅K−disclosure destroys surplus. Once it has compensated the worker for the shortfall in
utility (U¯ −W∅K ) by paying a positive training wage, the remaining level of expected profit
is less than that achievable under GK−disclosure; i.e. in Figure 2, point B lies to the left of
ΠGK . In contrast, suppose the worker’s outside option is at the level of point C (some distance
below WGK ). Now the firm will choose ∅K−disclosure. In this case the rent to be recouped is
large enough to justify the destruction of surplus; i.e. point C lies to the right of ΠGK .
Proposition 4 takes a restricted set of polices for comparison. This, it shares with most
of the disclosure literature. The implications for labour market outcomes are rather stark,
especially in that the distribution of wages for workers in the K firms becomes degenerate. We
now allow for a wider class of disclosure policies by specialising to a joint normal distribution.
3.2 Joint Normal Distribution, Arbitrary Disclosure Policies
For any firm I, the random variables (GI , RI) are now assumed to be joint normally dis-
tributed. In some of what follows (namely where we calculate wages), we will also assume
that GI and (RI − GI) are independent.17 To avoid confusion, we will term the former case
‘joint normality’ and the latter the ‘independent joint normal’ model.
3.2.1 Disclosure Policies, ΓI joint normal.
We also limit the set ΓI to disclosure policies such that (GI , RI , TI) are joint normally dis-
tributed with TI scalar. This assumption rules out mixed strategies (e.g. disclose GI with
probability p, RI with probability 1− p), conditional strategies (e.g. disclose RI if GI ≥ 0) and
partitional strategies (e.g. disclose either that GI ≥ 0 or GI < 0). It does, however, close the
model in a natural and interpretable way.
With (GI , RI , TI) joint normal, a convenient parameterisation is in terms of the linear
combination TI = aGI + bRI + cXI , where XI is a unit variance, independent noise term avail-
17All calculations are available from the authors as Mathematica Notebook files.
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able via QI . Since the random variable TI can always be rescaled to have any chosen mean
and variance without altering its information content, only two of the parameters a, b and c
are free. It is convenient to set a = 1− b, implying that disclosure policies are characterised
by the two parameters b and c:
TI = (1− b)GI + bRI + cXI . (13)
The above parameterisation simplifies the characterisation of the feasible set. However,
it will also be useful to map from these parameters to their associated regression coefficients.
In what follows, we will use two simple and two multiple regression coefficients. The simple
coefficients are on TI in the regression of GI (RI) on TI , which we denote by βGI TI (βRI TI ).
Normalising Var(GI) = 1, denoting Var(RI − GI) by σ2 and assuming Cov(GI , RI) = 1, these
coefficients write as
βGI TI =
1
(1+ b2σ2 + c2)
and
βRI TI =
1+ bσ2
(1+ b2σ2 + c2)
.
The multiple coefficients are on TI (RI) in the multiple regression of GI on TI and RI , which
we denote by βGI TI .RI (βGI RI .TI ) and write as
βGI TI .RI =
(1− b)σ2
(1+ σ2)(1+ b2σ2 + c2)− (1+ bσ2)2
and
βGI RI .TI =
(1+ b2σ2 + c2)− (1+ bσ2)
(1+ σ2)(1+ b2σ2 + c2)− (1+ bσ2)2 .
The three disclosure policies discussed in Section 3.1 are easily stated under either pa-
rameterisation. GI−disclosure corresponds to b = c = 0, giving βGI TI = βRI TI = 1 =
βGI TI .RI = 1 and βGI RI .TI = 0. RI−disclosure corresponds to b = 1, c = 0, giving βGI TI =
1/(1+ σ2) and βRI TI = 1 with the remaining coefficients undefined.
18 Finally, ∅I−disclosure
corresponds to c→ ∞, giving βGI TI = βRI TI = βGI TI .RI = 0 and βGI RI .TI = 1/(1+ σ2).
In addition to disclosing GI , RI or XI , our framework permits firm I to combine these
random variables. It is worth highlighting the following cases:
1. Garbling GI with b = 0, c 6= 0 (βGI TI .RI , βGI RI .TI > 0).
2. No garbling: Linear combinations of GI and RI
(a) Weighting (RI − GI), with b > 1, c = 0 (βGI TI .RI < 0, βGI RI .TI > 0).
18A singularity occurs at TI = RI .
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(b) Weighting GI , with 1 > b > 0, c = 0 (βGI TI .RI > 0, βGI RI .TI < 0).
(c) Differencing GI and RI with b < 0, c = 0 (βGI TI .RI , βGI RI .TI > 0).
Under each of these policies firm I’s retention behaviour conveys information and so there is
adverse selection for outsiders in recruitment, ASTI (t) 6= 0.
3.2.2 The Feasible Set
Our first result expresses wTI (t) in terms of the regression coefficients, the conditional stan-
dard deviation of the random variable [RI |TI = t], denoted by σRI |TI , and the unit normal
hazard function h.19
Proposition 5. Under joint normality, the equilibrium employment wage satisfies
wTI (t) = βGI TI t− βGI RI .TIσRI |TI h
(
βRI TI t− wTI (t)
σRI |TI
)
(14)
where finite. Equilibrium adverse selection therefore satisfies
ASTI (t) = βGI RI .TIσRI |TI h
(
βRI TI t− wTI (t)
σRI |TI
)
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
The employment wage function takes a particularly simple form for garblings of GI , i.e. dis-
closures of GI plus noise. In this case, adverse selection is constant and equilibrium employ-
ment wages equal expected outside productivity conditional only on TI less this constant. To
see this note that if TI is such a garbling, since RI − GI is uncorrelated with GI , it is uncorre-
lated with the garbling TI , hence β(RI−GI)TI = 0, and therefore βRI TI = βGI TI . Substituting this
into the wage equation yields
ASTI (t) = βGI RI .TIσRI |TI h
(
ASTI (t)
σRI |TI
)
, for all t,
which implicitly defines ASTI (t) as a constant. We can write this constant as
ASTI (0) = σRI |TI k(βGI RI .TI ). (16)
where k(x) is the iteration k(x) = xh (xh (...)) , this evidently has a fixed point at zero, the only
other is at a point we denote k ≈ 0.302. It follows that
19The conditional standard deviation writes as σRI |TI = ((1+ σ
2)− (1− b + (1+ σ2)b)2)1/2.
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Corollary 1. Under joint normality, for TI any garbling of GI , the equilibrium employment wage
satisfies
wTI (t) = βGI TI t− kσRI |TI ≈ βGI TI t− 0.3σRI |TI . (17)
The amount of adverse selection is, unsurprisingly, increasing in σRI |TI which is a measure
of how much uncertainty is left to be attributed to the retention decision. As TI garbles GI
more, σRI |TI increases. In general, for disclosure policies other than garblings of GI , of course,
adverse selection is not independent of the realised disclosure. Indeed, this fact is crucial to
the design of information management polices: the trick is to determine a disclosure policy
which imposes adverse selection disproportionately on those workers it is efficient to retain.
Note however that, for any given disclosure policy, the sign of adverse selection is constant
for all t (it is equal to βGI RI .TI ). Moreover at the realisation TI = 0, equation (16) remains
valid for any disclosure policy for which there is finite adverse selection. Hence, at the mean
realisation of the disclosed statistics, realised wages are ranked according to the conditional
standard deviations σRI |TI .
Proposition 5 solves for the employment wage in terms of a calculable function. Given
this function, the feasible setΩ(ΓI) can also be calculated. Following the discussion in Section
3.1.3, our primary interest lies in the upper boundary of Ω(ΓI) below E[GK]. Recall that with
reservation utility U¯ below E[GK], firm K will seek to switch away from GK−disclosure to a
policy that drives the expected employment wage down to U¯. The most attractive policy is
the one that achieves this expected employment wage while generating the highest expected
second period profit ΠTI ; that is, the most efficient policy that achieves WTI = U¯. For this
reason, we refer to the upper boundary of Ω(ΓI) as the efficiency frontier. Our next result
(calculated using (14) with GI and (RI − GI) assumed independent) shows that the efficiency
frontier does not consist of policies which garble GI with noise, rather GI is combined with
RI .
Proposition 6. In the independent joint normal model, for any firm I, the efficiency frontier of the set
Ω(ΓI) is generated by the disclosure policies TI = (1− b)GI + bRI , with b < 1, c = 0.
1. With 1 > b > 0, expected employment wages WTI are greater than E[GI ].
2. With b = 0, expected employment wages equal E[GI ].
3. With b < 0, expected employment wages are less than E[GI ].
4. A policy with b = 1, c = 0 is on the lower boundary of the set.
5. A policy with b > 1, c = 0 induces extreme adverse selection, expected employment wages
are infinite.
Before turning to equilibrium contracts and labour market outcomes, it is worth pausing
to discuss features of the feasible set and, in particular, its efficiency frontier plotted in Figure
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3 (for values of b ∈ [1/3,−4/3]). We first consider what is required for a disclosure policy to
drive the expected employment wage below E[GK], then how a given reduction in WTI can be
achieved most efficiently.
To drive the expected employment wage below E[GI ], firm I must ensure that expected
adverse selection is positive. Since the sign of ASTI (t) is the same for all realisations of TI , this
requires that ASTI (t) be positive for some t. From (15), ASTI (t) is positive only if βGI RI .TI >
0, giving a simple and intuitive condition. Firm I will create adverse (rather than positive)
selection − i.e. depress wTI (t) = E[GI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)] below E[G|T = t] − if and only if
a lower value of RI is bad news for GI given TI .
One might think that this condition will hold whenever retention behaviour is informa-
tive. As Figure 3 illustrates, this is not the case; part of the feasible set lies above E[GI ]. The
unifying feature of these policies with βGI RI .TI < 0 is that GI is combined with RI , with more
weight on GI .20 Of course, as Figure 3 also illustrates, there are many policies that do satisfy
this condition and hence drive the expected employment wage below E[GK]. Indeed, of the
four types of ‘combined’ policies listed above, only the third fails. The question is therefore
why some of these policies are more efficient than others, and in particular why the fourth
type (b < 0, c = 0) traces out the efficiency frontier below E[GI ]?
To see the answer, note that, even when two disclosure policies generate the same ex-
pected employment wage, the distribution of adverse selection over t may vary. Figure 4 il-
lustrates, depicting two disclosure policies that generate the same expected adverse selection
(the area under both quantile functions is ≈ 0.47) but with very different distributions. A
garbling of GI (policy C) depresses wages uniformly: ASTI is constant at every quantile of
TI = GI +
√
5/2XI . In contrast, differencing RI and GI (policy D) imposes a lot of adverse
selection at low quantiles of TI = 3/2GI − 1/2RI and little adverse selection at high quantiles
(and indeed none at p = 1). This is efficient, as low quantiles are associated with a good
matches, while high quantiles are associated with bad matches. Since this policy depresses
wages most when retention is efficient and least when retention is inefficient, it generates a
higher surplus than the policy where wages are depressed uniformly (in Figure 3 the wage-
profit pair associated with policy C lies to the left of the pair associated with policy D).
The above logic explains why the first type of policy is less efficient than the fourth,
and indeed why a garbling of a differenced estimate of inside and outside productivity (b <
0, c 6= 0) lies inside the efficiency frontier. All that remains is to consider the second type
of policy (b > 1, c = 0). The reason why this type of policy fails to trace out the efficiency
frontier is simple. By weighting the disclosure statistic towards RI − GI , that is match quality,
the firm eliminates regression to the mean. This leaves adverse selection to hit with full force,
depressing wages not simply below E[GI ] but as far as the lower support.
20With no noise (c = 0), any b ∈ (0, 1) will generate positive selection. With noise, the range of policies becomes
more tightly bounded above 0 and below 1.
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Having discussed the important features of the feasible set we now turn to equilibrium
contracts and labour market outcomes.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Contracts
We start by stating that firms never adopt disclosure policies which induce a negative con-
ditional correlation between estimates of inside productivity and outside productivity. Intu-
itively, this makes sense since, if such a negative correlation were present, then the event that a
worker is not retained becomes ‘good news’ regarding the outside productivity of the worker.
This is the opposite of a winners’ curse and the positive rather than adverse selection effect
would serve to drive up the wage offers of competing employers, making it more expensive
to retain workers.
Proposition 7. Under joint normality, neither competitive nor skill augmenting firms ever choose a
disclosure policy with βGI RI .TI < 0.
Proof. The fact that each competitive firm J chooses GJ−disclosure follows from Propo-
sition 1. Suppose the skill-augmenting firm chooses βGK RK .TK < 0. Then expected second
period profit is
E[(RK − wTK(TK))+] = E[(RK − E[GK|TK]− ASTK(TK))+]
≤ E[(RK − E[GK|TK])+] ≤ E[E[(RK − GK)+|TK]] = E[(RK − GK)+],
where the first inequality follows from ASTK(TK) ≤ 0 and the second follows from application
of Jensen’s inequality. A disclosure policy with βGK RK .TK < 0 therefore leads to lower expected
second period profit than general disclosure.
The nature of the disclosure policies chosen by skill-augmenting firms is described as
follows, where U¯ = E[GJ ] + E[(RJ − GJ)+].
Proposition 8. In the independent joint normal model, for a skill-augmenting firm K,
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ≤ U¯ suffices), then contracts are GK−disclosure and a training wage of
wK = max{U¯ − E[GK], 0}.
2. If E[GK] is large (E[GK] > U¯ suffices), then contracts are a disclosure policy TK = (1− b)GK −
bRK, with b increasing in E[GK], and a training wage of wK = 0.
This result follows directly from the calculation of the efficiency frontier. It is helpful to
compare the equilibrium contracts chosen by a skill augmenting firm when ΓK is joint normal
with the case discussed in Section 3.1 where ΓK = {GK, RK,∅K}. The first part of the result is
simply a restatement of the first part of Proposition 4: if the general skills acquired at firm K are
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expected to be low, then firm K chooses GK−disclosure to meet the worker’s reservation utility
in the most efficient manner possible. However, if firm K is advantaged, so that the general
skills acquired at firm K are expected to exceed the worker’s reservation utility (as pinned
down by the competitive fringe), then the firm will switch to a policy that generates adverse
selection. Of course, it is in the firm’s interest to depress wages as efficiently as possible and so
the disclosure policy will be a (noiseless) difference of inside and outside productivity. As the
size of the skill gap increases, firm K claws back rent from the worker by increasing expected
adverse selection (decreasing b further below zero thereby increasing βGK RK .TK ).
3.2.4 Labour Market Outcomes
This section traces the map from technological differences, via human capital management
policies through information management to labour market outcomes. We start by discussing
the skill augmenting sector, and then turn to outcomes for the wider economy.
Comparative Statics of Sector-Specific Outcomes With Var(GK) normalised to 1, the tech-
nological position of a skill augmenting firm K is characterised by three parameters: expected
general human capital formation E[GK], expected match quality E[RK − GK] and the vari-
ance of match quality Var(RK − GK). The following result describes how changes in these
parameters impact on labour market outcomes in the skill-augmenting sector (holding the
technological position of the competitive sector fixed).
Proposition 9. In the independent joint normal model,
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ≤ U¯ suffices),
i. the probability of labour turnover is independent of E[GK] and Var(RK − GK) and is decreasing in
E[RK − GK];
ii. the distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK.
2. If E[GK] is large (E[GK] > U¯ suffices)
i. the probability of labour turnover is increasing in Var(RK − GK) and decreasing in E[GK] and
E[RK − GK];
ii. the distribution of employment wages has mean U¯ but is no longer normal, with inequality decreas-
ing in Var(RK − GK) and increasing in E[GK] and E[RK − GK].
Proposition 9 is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 (plotted for E[GJ ] = E[RJ − GJ ] = 0,
Var(GJ) = Var(RJ −GJ) = 1, implying U¯ = E[(RJ −GJ)+] = 1/
√
2pi). We start by discussing
the consequences of technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector for labour turnover.
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Our analysis of the general model established that, for values of E[GK] ≤ U¯, labour
turnover occurs with probability Pr[RK < GK] and is therefore independent of E[GK] by As-
sumption 3. Figure 5 Panel a plots the case where match quality is distributed symmetrically
around zero, giving rise to a turnover rate of 50% (the top line). Consider a technological
change that increases E[GK] above U¯. A skill-augmenting firm will respond by adjusting its
disclosure policy (decreasing b) to claw back the associated rent from its worker. The adverse
selection associated with this change in organisational design depresses labour turnover.21
As one might expect, labour turnover also decreases with a change in technology that
‘improves matching’ (E[RK − GK]). Here, however, endogenous organisational design damp-
ens the effect. Figure 5 Panel b illustrates by plotting the turnover rate against E[RK − GK],
holding E[GK] = Var(RK − GK) = 1. If E[GK] ≤ U¯ the turnover rate is equal to Pr[(RK −
GK) < 0] which is evidently decreasing in E[RK − GK]. With E[GK] > U¯, however, firm K will
seek to impose adverse selection. Suppose that E[RK − GK] declines below 1 but that firm K
(sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy fixed at b ≈ −0.37. Labour turnover increases but
at a slower rate than Pr[(RK − GK) < 0] (compare the middle and the highest line in the Fig-
ure). In other words, adverse selection mutes the effect of a decline in E[RK − GK] on labour
turnover. This dampening effect becomes stronger if firm K adjusts its disclosure policy to
keep its worker at U¯ (the bottom line in the Figure). As E[RK − GK] declines, regression to the
mean ameliorates adverse selection. Larger deviations (more negative b) from GK−disclosure
are therefore necessary to generate sufficient adverse selection and these adjustments depress
labour turnover further below Pr[(RK − GK) < 0].
Figure 5 Panel c illustrates the impact of Var(RK − GK), holding E[GK] = 1, E[RK −
GK] = 0. Again, with E[GK] > U¯, firm K will seek to impose adverse selection. Suppose that
Var(RK − GK) declines below 1 but that firm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy
fixed at b ≈ −0.64. Labour turnover decreases further below Pr[(RK − GK) < 0] (compare the
bottom and highest line in the Figure). This effect is muted, however, if firm K adjusts its dis-
closure policy to keep its worker at U¯ (the middle line in the Figure). Since poorer information
about match quality reduces the regression to the mean effect, adverse selection hits harder.
Smaller deviations (less negative b) from GK−disclosure are necessary to generate sufficient
adverse selection and this depresses labour turnover less below Pr[(RK − GK) < 0].
Turning to the distribution of employment wages: for values of E[GK] ≤ U¯, the distri-
bution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK. Given our assumption that
GK and (RK − GK) are independent, the distributions for retained and released workers are
identical. For higher values of E[GK], firm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep the expected
employment wage equal to U¯. Since adverse selection is greater at lower quantiles of TK (recall
Figure 4), the distribution of employment wages is no longer normal, but becomes negatively
21Notice that the probability of labour turnover is convex in E[GK ], implying that the model generates empiri-
cally plausible levels of job mobility even in the presence of a substantial skill gap.
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skewed.
Figure 6 Panel a illustrates. With E[GK] = 1/
√
2pi, firm K chooses GK−disclosure and
so the distribution of employment wages following training at firm K simply reflects the
distribution of general human capital (i.e. N[1/
√
2pi, 1]). If E[GK] = 2 but firm K chooses
GK−disclosure, then the distribution of employment wages is translated to N[2, 1]. Of course,
it is optimal for the firm to alter its disclosure policy, in this case to b ≈ −2. This adjustment
drives the mean employment wage back down to U¯ and, with adverse selection hitting hard-
est on the low TK quantiles, skews the distribution to the left.
The remaining panels in Figure 6 hold expected general human capital formation fixed
and vary the distribution of match quality (RK −GK). Suppose that E[GK] = Var(RK −GK) =
E[RK − GK] = 1 and that firm K chooses a disclosure policy with b ≈ −0.37. If E[RK − GK]
declines, so that the expected retained human capital is lower, but firm K (sub-optimally)
leaves its disclosure policy fixed then there is less adverse selection. As Panel b illustrates,
this change in adverse selection both compresses, and increases the mean of, the distribution
of employment wages. Since the expected employment wage now exceeds the worker’s reser-
vation utility, it is optimal for the firm to alter its disclosure policy, here to b ≈ −1.51. This
adjustment reintroduces adverse selection and skews the distribution of employment wages
to the left.
Finally, consider the impact of a change in Var(RK−GK). Suppose that E[GK] = Var(RK−
GK) = 1, E[RK−GK] = 0 and that firm K chooses its optimal disclosure policy with b ≈ −0.64.
If Var(RK − GK) declines but firm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy fixed there is
more adverse selection. As Panel c illustrates, this change in adverse selection disperses, and
decreases the mean of, the distribution of employment wages. Since the expected wage is
below U¯, it is optimal for the firm to alter its disclosure policy, now to b ≈ −0.30. This
adjustment removes adverse selection, reducing the left skewness of distribution of employ-
ment wages. Indeed, as Panel c makes clear, the overall effect of a decrease in the variance of
RK − GK resembles a mean-preserving spread in wages.
Note that one can interpret an increase in the variance of an estimate as an improve-
ment in information. This follows since conditioning on extra information produces a mean
preserving spread of conditional expectations: E[YKK − YKJ |QK, Q′K] is a mean preserving
spread of E[YKK −YKJ |QK]. An increase in Var(RK −GK) therefore follows from technological
changes that give firm K a better idea of worker match quality. Improvements in information
about match quality therefore compress wage distributions. This contrast with improvements
in information about general human capital (when firms are competitive).
Implications for Economy-wide Outcomes We will not attempt a comprehensive explana-
tion of the stylised facts concerning changes in turnover rates and wage inequality which have
been argued to have occurred since the 1980’s. The reader is referred to Katz and Autor (1999)
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or Acemoglu (2002), both of which provide excellent introductions to the wide-ranging em-
pirical literature. This literature has already recognised that institutional and organisational
changes might interact with demand, supply and technology changes and thereby play a role
in explaining labour market outcomes.22 We can add that if innovations take time to diffuse
through the economy, technical change will also generally impact on labour market outcomes
by altering the distribution of firm competitiveness within an industry. Our model evidently
supplies one specific framework within which to explore some of these interacting effects.
Consider first the competitive benchmark. If all firms are competitive, then employment
wage inequality is determined by the riskiness of the random variable GI = E[YI I′ |QI ]; the
more informative is QI about productivity, the higher is employment wage inequality. Given
the absence of adverse selection, labour turnover is high.
Suppose as a comparative statics exercise, we adopt Assumption 3′ and firms are trans-
formed one by one, from J-type to K-type in the independent joint normal model. Starting
from all firms being competitive (J-firms), the wage distribution of workers will be uniform
across the economy and turnover rates will be high. Transforming the firms progressively into
K-types will alter the distribution of wages, and generally reduce labour turnover. According
to the results of section 3.2.4, the wages of workers conditional on being in a K-firm will show
more inequality and be skewed to the left relative to workers in competitive firms. However,
as the number of K-firms grows, the competitive wage will eventually be determined by the
marginal K-firm, turnover will increase and the distribution of wages will revert to its ini-
tial pattern but translated to the right. During this latter phase, turnover of workers in skill
enhancing firms increases and their wage distribution skews to the right, relatively.
So far, we have limited the discussion to a single pool of ex-ante identical workers in
which there were a mix of J-firms and K-firms. However, the labour literature has increas-
ingly emphasised the role of skill-biased technology.23 Consider an interacting multisector
version of our model in which high tech firms (of both J and K type, call them HJ and HK
types) employ predominantly ex-ante high productivity skilled workers and low tech firms
(again of both J and K type, call them LJ and LK types) employ predominantly ex-ante low
productivity unskilled workers. Now suppose that technological change transforms some LK
firms into HK firms. It is natural to think of this as an innately able entrepreneur becoming
technically proficient, or as good business practice being transferred from simple to complex
activities. This transformation reduces competition for LK firms wishing to employ unskilled
labour but increases it for HK firms wishing to employ skilled labour. The endogenous or-
ganisational response of HK firms shifts the mean employment wage distribution for skilled
workers to the right as adverse selection policies are driven out and furthermore skews it to
the right. Turnover of these workers also increases. On the other hand, for employers of un-
22See Acemoglu (2002).
23See Violante (forthcoming), Acemoglu (2002) and Hornstein et al (2005) for surveys of this literature.
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skilled workers, the effects go in the opposite direction, wages are reduced, skewed to the left
and turnover decreases.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our starting premise was to identify organisational design with human capital management
via information management. Our model has allowed us to characterise optimal information
management policies. These policies are determined according to whether the employer is
constrained principally by the need to attract workers (participation constraints) or by an in-
ability to fully leverage acquired general human capital talent (credit constraints). As has been
recognised since Akerlof (1970), the distribution of information can have striking, apparently
disproportionate, effects on market outcomes. Our analysis has also highlighted that, where
organisational responses to technological change impact through information flows, the con-
sequences for wages and turnover rates may appear to be disproportionately large.
We have, of course, taken a somewhat narrow view of organisational design, even given
our exclusive focus on information management. In particular, we have abstracted from en-
dogenous information acquisition.24 For the purposes of inducing adverse selection, acquir-
ing more information with a fixed amount disclosed is akin to disclosing less with a fixed
amount acquired. In other words, firms can manage information simply by getting to know
their workers better. Skill augmenting and competitive firms will generally take a very differ-
ent view. For competitive firms, information privately acquired about their worker’s general
human capital becomes a hot potato—something to be passed on to the market as quickly
as possible. In contrast, for skill-augmenting firms, incentives to acquire private information
about worker productivity are more nuanced and one would expect to see deliberate policies
designed to generate such information. These differential incentives are likely to accentuate
the increased wage inequality for skill augmenting firms identified in the paper.
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Appendix
Proof of statement in Assumption 2. The statement is: E[GI |RI = r], r− E[GI |RI = r]
and E[GI |RI − GI = r] are all increasing in r and, for any w ∈ R, E[GI |RI ≤ w] ≤ E[GI ]
and E[GI |RI ≥ w] ≥ E[GI ]. Let SI = RI − GI and denote the density of (SI , GI) as f (s, g).
The density of (RI , GI) is therefore f (r− g, g) it follows that from affiliation and log concavity
that both f (s, g) and f (g, r − g) are TP2, i.e. both (SI , GI) and (RI , GI) are affiliated. This
implies E[GI |RI = r] and E[RI − GI |RI = r] are increasing in r as required. Also, for all w,
E[GI |RI ≤ w] ≤ E[GI ].
Proof of Proposition 5. By the law of iterated expectations
wTI (t) = E [GI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)] = E [E [GI |TI = t, RI ] |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)] .
Using the regression equation
E [GI |TI = t, RI ]− µG = βGT.R (t− µT) + βGR.TRI
and µT = 0, we have
wTI (t) = E [µG + βGT.Rt + βGR.TRI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)]
= µG + βGT.Rt + βGR.TE [RI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)] .
Since the conditional random variable has a normal distribution: [RI |TI = t] ∼
N
(
E[RI |TI = t], σ2R|T
)
, we can write [RI |TI = t] in terms of a standard normal random vari-
able Z
[RI |TI = t] ≡ E[RI |TI = t] + σR|TZ.
Using Z,
wTI (t) = µG + βGT.Rt + βGR.TE [RI |TI = t, RI ≤ wTI (t)]
= µG + βGT.Rt + βGR.TE[RI |TI = t] + βGR.TσR|TE[Z|Z ≤
wTI (t)− E[RI |TI = t]
σR|T
].
Using the regression equation E [RI |TI = t]− µR = βRT (t− µT) and µR = 0 (?), we have
wTI (t) = µG + t (βGT.R + βGR.TβRT) + βGR.TσR|TE[Z|Z ≤
wTI (t)− E[RI |TI = t]
σR|T
]
or using Cochrane’s identity βGT = βGT.R + βGR.TβRT,
wTI (t) = E[GI |TI = t] + βGR.TσR|TE[Z|Z ≤
wTI (t)− E[RI |TI = t]
σR|T
].
Noting that since φ′(x) = −xφ(x),∫ z
−∞ φ
′(x)dx
Φ(z)
=
φ(z)
Φ(z)
=
φ(−z)
1−Φ(−z) = h(−z) = −
∫ z
−∞ xφ(x)dx
Φ(z)
= −E[Z|Z ≤ z]
gives the required expression for wTI (t).
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Panel a: Plotted for Var(GK) = Var(RK − GK) = 1, E[RK − GK] = 0, U¯ = 1√2pi .
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Figure 5: The Probability of Labour Turnover
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Panel a: Plotted for Var(GK) = Var(RK − GK) = 1, E[RK − GK] = 0, U¯ = 1√2pi .
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